XplanaZine

Introduction

Part 1 of this paper addressed the manner in which the human mind evolves by arranging perceptions by means of connections. This section deals with the implications of that “perception” in terms of the reality that is created through user interactions with the Internet, and in terms of the resulting significance of individual perception.

How the Mind Makes Meaning in E-Learning, Part II

The Internet Re-creates and Reinforces Essence: As opposed to those who would suggest that all of reality is a constructed event, and that “essence” does not exist, and that no thing possesses an essential, primordial beingness, the Internet exists as a tacit reminder that all that is perceived via the Internet relies on the perceiver having at least one idea of what the thing is that they are perceiving. If the reader’s mind is a perfect tabula rasa, then there is no way at all for the person to be able to classify what he or she is perceiving. Further, if there is no essential idea of what the thing is, and if it has no primordial beingness, then there is no way to measure or ascertain whether or not it is “real.”

The essence of something is communicated by means of a referent. This often relies on the semiotic and symbol systems, of which language is one, images and signs are another. In basic terms, this means that you one comes to understand what something is (its essence) by means of something else (a referent).

Let’s a use a basic example. What do you think of when you think “rose”? Do you think of a flower? Is it red? Does it have bright petals, a long stalk, thorns, and a delightful, sweet and delicate scent? The referent of “rose” is the word itself. “Rose” indicates the flower, and all that that particular flower symbolizes (love, for example). However, the referent can be an image. It can be a botanical sketch, a photograph, a painting. But what do you think of when you think “rose”? Chances are, the rose that is “essential rose” will be an archetypal rose — pruned, groomed, dark red, in a bouquet of 12, or presented singly, festooned with a lovely ribbon and a card expressing abstract concepts (”love” and “devotion” and “romance”).

The referent refers to a plant, and it also refers to a concept. In the case of a rose, the “essential” rose is one that evokes feelings and abstract concepts as well as the botanical counterpart, the rose flower or rose bush. Since essence is communicated by a referent, the implications are powerful in Internet design. The key is to analyze what emotional impact one wishes to have, and what overarching idea one wishes to communicate. Then, by working back & then extrapolating forward, one can choose the perfect referent to convey the nuanced and multiple meanings that one wishes, as well as a certain desired “essence.” Perhaps this is the anatomy of constructivism. At least it’s an approach. It’s pragmatic, too.

Essence is often reinforced by evoking mental images, especially ones that correspond to powerful emotions. Memories — either real or induced — often are used as the arbiters of essence. When you remember, what comes to mind? Is it an image? Is it a series of images? Is it a scent? A touch? A texture? A taste? A remembered sibilance or a softly droning assonance? If one evokes mental images, then the mind naturally moves to associations.

The associations are part of the connectionist structure of the brain. This is interesting, and it helps explain why people “jump” to conclusions, and why the “saltos” and leaps the mind makes are not so random as one might think. There is enormous power in harnessing the “saltos” — if one can manage the connections, the leaps, then one can persuade (absolutely with subtlety, precision, nuance) another to a foregone conclusion. This is the essence of propaganda. It is also the underpinning structure of persuasive discourse. What makes the procedure even more effective is to combine all of this with emotion-evoking images and discourse.

An experience deliberately designed to coincide with the “essence” of something will immediately be classified in one’s mind, and later will be difficult to dislodge. And example of this are the “reality experiences” of Walt Disney World, where individuals role-play and interact with the “essence” of something. And example is a roller-coaster in which participants are guided through a scenario in which they interact with the holographic images of well-known rock stars (in one case, Aerosmith), and then accompany them on a roller-coaster ride to their concert. In the scenario, the drive to the concert is so intense, it is “like a roller-coaster ride” when in fact, it really is a roller-coaster ride (!) So, the holographic images, which are more real than the real members of the band are the “essence” of Aerosmith — the quintessential Aerosmith. Since viewing the images, and interacting with them was combined with actual physical sensations, it is unlikely that any of the participants will forget the images they saw, and will from that day on, when they think of the group, Aerosmith, they will not think of photographs or even band appearances, but of their “interaction” with the group on the “reality ride” in Walt Disney World.

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